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SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISING
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

FROM

VIII.
The Rights and Privi eges of Belligerent Armed Vessels in Neutral Ports.
By AMos S.

HERSHEY,

Associate Professr of European History and Politics, Indiana University.

N

EXT
to thethequestions
relating toissues
contraband,
most important
raised during the present war from the
standpoint of International Law have thus
far' been those connected with the rights
and privileges of belligerent armed ships in
neutral ports.
One of these questions was raised almost
at the very beginning of the war when the
Russian gunboat Mandjur remained in the
neutral harbor of Shanghai where she was
lying at the outbreak of hostilities) in defiance of the orders which had been issued
by the Chinese authorities, acting upon the
representations of the Japanese consul, that
she leave that port within twenty-four
hours

2

Japan repeated her demands at Peking
and is even said to have threatened a resort
to force, but the conduct of the Chinese
Government seems to have been extremely
weak and vacillating. After prolonged negotiations and repeated agreements to disarm on the part of the Russian authoritiesagreements which do not appear to have
been effectively carried out-the Mandjur
was finally disarmed and dismantled, and
'November 5, 1904.
2The reluctance of the Mandjur to leave Shanghai appears to have been due to the fact that a
large Japanese cruiser was said to have been lying outside the harbor. Mr. De Lessar, the Russian minister at Peking, maintained, however,
that the presence of the Mandyur in Shanghai was
necessary for the protection of the Russian Consulate there. This question derived additional
importance from the fact that the neutrality of
China had in a sense been guaranteed by the
Powers.
The solution of the problem was
anxiously awaited by the whole world. See The
Green Bag for June, i904, for the second article
of this series entitled, "The Hay Note and
Chinese Neutrality."

the important parts of her machinery and
armament were placed in the custody of the
Chinese Government toward the end of
March.
Another case of the abuse of the hospitality of neutral ports on the part of a Russian vessel arose in February. The Dmitri
Donskoi, a cruiser belonging to the Russian
Mediterranean fleet, obtained coal at Port
Said on the plea that it was needed to enable
her to steam to Cadiz on her return voyage
to Russia. But the coal thus obtained for
an innocent purpose was used in stopping
and overhauling several neutral vessels in
the vicinity of the Mediterranean entrance
to the Suez Canal. "It is quite clear," says
Lawrence4 "that the neutrality of Egypt
was violated in a gross and open manner.
It is an accepted rule that no proximate acts
of war must take place in neutral waters,
and they must not be used as a base of
operations by either party."
An Associated Press dispatch of February 2o, 1904, stated that friendly comimnications between France and Japan had been
exchanged with respect to the stay of the
Russian Mediterranean squadron at Jibutil
in French Somaliland-a stay which exceeded the twenty-four hours supposed to
be prescribed by International Law. But
the explanation of France for not ordering
the Russian vessels to leave Jibutil within
that period of time was said to have been
entirely satisfactory to the Japanese Government. It appears that the French an-

'On the case of the Mandjur, see the newspapers from February i to March 26, I9O4. See
especially an article in Collier's Weekly for April 9'War and NVeutrality, p. II6.
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thorities at that port also permitted the
Russian vessels to take in a full supply of
coal.' The British Government, on the
other hand, not only insisted upon the enforcement of the twenty-four hour rule, but
refused to supply Russian warships with
more coal than was needed to carry them
to some nearer neutral destination.
The right of belligerent warships to coal
in neutral ports has been much discussed
It has deduring the present struggle.
and
importance
interest
particular
rived
from frequent reports that the Russian Baltic fleet intended speedily to leave the Baltic
Sea for the Far East-a departure repeatedly announced, but always deferred until
.the middle of October. It is well known
that Russia has no coaling stations of its
own, and that if the Baltic Fleet ever proposes to reach its destination, it must depend upon accompanying colliers for its
coal-a difficult and dangerous expedientor upon neutral ports for sufficient supplies.2
It is generally believed that the French
and German Governments" would raise no
'Lawrence, oh. cit., pp. 120 and 12,3. This co:rects a previous statement made by the writer in
The Green Bag for July, 1904. See p. 458 of V.1.
XVI.
Spanish Government was at first reported
to have refused to permit the Baltic Fleet to coal
at Vigo on October 26, but the following day it
was announced that the Spanish authorities at
Vigo had permitted each vessel to take on 400
tons. See New York Times for October 27 and
28.
The Spanish Government is also said to
have "authorized the Russian warships at Vigo
to remain in port and complete repairs on condition that they leave immediately after repairs
are completed." Chicago Tribune for October 28,
1904. The Baltic fleet remained several days at
Vigo and then proceeded to Tangier where it
was apparently permitted to take on a full supply
of coal and provisions by the Moorish authorities on October 30. Numerous complaints have
2The

since been made by the Japanese -Press,of the
facilities for coaling afforded to the Baltic fleet in
French ports.
'See especially the London Times (weekly ed.)
for September .30, 2904 for a summary of documents published on this subject by M. Hutin in
the Echo de Paris. The German Government let
it be known, however, as early as February that
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objections to the granting of supplies of
coal to Russian vessels at French and German ports, at least in quantities sufficient
to enable them to reach the next neutral
ports, but the British Government has taken
much more advanced ground. In her Neutrality Proclamation of February 1O, 1904,
Great Britain instructed the authorities in
British ports not to permit belligerent warships to take on more coal than is necessary
to carry them to the nearest home port, "or
to some nearer named neutral destination,"'
and in a more recent set of instructions,
sent to the Governors of British Colonies
and Dependencies, even more advanced
ground than this was taken. The British
authorities were advised that they were in
the future to refuse to grant facilities for
coaling or provisioning in British ports to
belligerent vessels "proceeding to the theatre of war or to any position or positions
on the line of route with the object of intercepting neutral ships on suspicion of carring contraband of war.""
the Baltic Fleet would not be permitted to pass
through the Kiel Canal. In this respect at least.
as also in disarming the Russian warships at
Tsing-Tau, Germany has perhaps more than fulfilled her neutral obligations.
'This phrase is omitted in the American proclamation of neutrality.
'From the text of a proclamation issued by
the Governor of Malta on August 12, 1904. See
London Times (weekly ed.) for August 26, 1904.
The "Instructions" themselves have not been
published, so far as we are aware. The Proclamation of the Governor of Malta also declares
that "such fleet shall not be permitted to make
use in any way of any port, roadstead, or waters
subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty for the
purpose of coaling either directly from the shore
or from colliers accompanying such fleet, whether
vessels of such fleet present themselves to any
such port or roadstead or within the said waters
at the same time or successively."
The Egyptian Neutrality Order of February 12,
I904, provides that "before the commander of a
belligerent ship-of-war is allowed to obtain coal
in any port of Egypt, he must obtain a formal

authorization from the authorities of the port,
specifying the amount he may take. Such authorization is to be granted only after the receipt

from the commander of a written statement, setting forth the name of the port to which he is
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The question of the rights and privileges
of belligerent armed ships in neutral ports
came up in a very acute form in the month
of August when a number of vessels belonging to the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur
succeeded in escaping to various neutral
ports on the Chinese coast after their defeat at the hands of the Japanese on August
io. The Russian torpedo boat destroyer
Ryeshitelni, which had taken refuge in the
Chinese port of Che-Foo, was seized and
towed out of the harbor by several Japanese
destroyers on the night of August ii, in
spite of the fact that the Russian vessel was
partially disabled and that she had been at
least partly disarmed,' in accordance with
the demand of the Chinese Admiral at CheFoo. This was an undoubted violation of
Chinese neutrality and of the law of nations
on the part of Japan, the serious character
of which has in nowise been weakened by
to go next, and the amount of coal he has at the
moment in his bunkers. He will then be permitted to take what is sufficient for the purpose
declared to be in view, and no more." Lawrence,
1'Var and Neutrality, pp. 134-35. But, as Lawrence
points out, experience has shown that this rule
may be evaded as in the case of the Dimitri
Donskoi. (See above.) He suggests (p. 136) that
there be added to the rule "a clause to the effect
that any coal obtained by means of them for
cruising purposes, or for steaming to a different
destination, unless in the event of chase by an
enemy, shall disqualify both the vessel and her
commander from receiving further supplies in any
port of the same neutral during the same war."
"This," he thinks, "would put an end to evasions." It seems to us, however, that even this
amendment would be insufficient.
It would not
prevent the Baltic Fleet from making use of neutral ports to speed it on its destination to the Far
East. Only such total prohibitions as are contained in the Proclamation by the Governor of
Malta would appear to be sufficient for this purpose.
'This was the case, at least, according to the
statements of the Russian commander and Admiral Alexieff. But the fact of disarment was denied by the Japanese Navy Department. For the
official statements on both sides, see London
Times (weekly ed.) for August 19, 1904. See also
New York Times for August 15. The fact that the
.Ryeshitelni was partly disarmed was practically
admitted by M. Takahira, the Japanese Minister
at Washington, in an interview published in the
New York Times for August 28, 1904. See also
Count Cassini's interview in the New York Herald for August I9.

the specious grounds on which it has been
defended.
The Japanese are said to have attempted
to justify their action on the ground that
China had failed to enforce her neutrality
over against Russia 2 that the neutrality
of China was plainly imperfect inasmuch
as she was incapable of fulfilling her neutral
obligations, and that, in the face of plain
proofs of such incompetence, Japan was
compelled to enforce her belligerent rights.
It was also said that Japan did not intend
torepeat the Mandjur farce, and that she
could not afford to break up her fleet for
the purpose of watching Chinese ports in
which Russian-vessels are abusing the privileges of asylum and taking advantage of
China's inability to enforce neutral rightsA
Without examining into the truth or seriousness of these charges, it is sufficient to
observe that none of them, even if fully
proven, would justify the violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty. One international wrong does not justify another, and
there are other ways of obtaining redress
for violations of neutrality, which are not
too gross or serious, than that of an attack
upon territorial sovereignty. As stated by
Daniel Webster, then (1841) Secretary of
State, in the case of the Caroline,4 in order
to excuse such an act as the violation of
neutral territorial sovereignty, one must
"show a necessity of self-defense,
instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means
'Amongst the violations of Chinese neutrality
by Russia were enumerated the constant violations of the neutrality of Chinese territory between the Great Wall and the Liao river, Russia's
disregard of the neutrality of the treaty-port of
Niu-Chwang, the sinking of a Chinese vessel
named the Hipsang, and the use by Russian
agents of the Chinese port of Che-Foo as a base
of supplies and military operations during the
war. (It is claimed that Che-Foo has been used
by Russia as a wireless telegraphy station, and
that Chinese junks have been using this port as a
base for the blockade of Port Arthur.)
'See Tokio Correspondent to the London
Times (weekly ed.) for August 19, 1904.
4
See Wharton's Digest, I., §5oc.
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and no moment for deliberation." And as
our most eminent jurist" has well said in
a famous case, "if there be no prohibition,
the ports of a friendly nation are considered
as open to the public ships of all powers
with whom it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports and remain in
them while allowed to remain, under the
protection of the Government of the place."
"It is the duty of the belligerent to refrain
from the exercise of hostilities within the
shelter of neutral territorial waters,' and,
if any vessel, whether belligerent or neutral,
be assailed within such limits, it is incumbent on the neutral Government in the first
instance to defend her against her assailant,
and, if she he captured, to exert itself to the
'Chief Justice Marshall in Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch II6.
2
See the opinion of Sir W. Scott (later Lord
Stowell) in the case of the Anna (5 C. Rob. 373),
where it was held that the capture of an enemy's
ship in neutral waters is illegal, and that such
a vessel must be restored by the prize court of
the captor. Sir W. Scott gave it as his opinion
that this would be so even if the vessel had been
pursued into neutral waters. Instances of the violation of neutral territory have not been altogether rare, even in the present century. They
were perhaps the rule rather than the exception in
the eighteenth century. The United States was
guilty of at least two such violations during the
Civil War-the Florida in Brazilian, and the
Chesapeake in British waters; but in both these
cases, the acts were disavowed and ample apology
and reparation were made.
The case of the General Armstrong (see Wharton's Digest, II., §227), in which Louis Napoleon
acted as arbitrator in 1852, has been cited in support of the action of the Japanese, but the case
is not at all analogous. Besides, although the
decision was doubtless right, it appears to have
been based on a wrong principle. In that case
it was decided that the Portugese Government
could not be held responsible for the destruction
of the American privateer General Armstrong in
consequence of an attack by a British fleet in
Portugese waters in 1814, inasmuch as the American vessel had begun the actual attack and because her captain had not applied "from the beginning for the intervention of the neutral sovereign." As Lawrence (Principles, p. 5410 points
out, while this award was right, the principle of
the decision was wrong in so far as it appears to
support the broad doctrine laid down by
some
writers
(see
Hall,
p.
628),
that
a "belligerent, who, when attacked in neutral territory, elects to defend himself, instead
of trusting for protection or redress to his host,
by his own violation of sovereignty frees the

neutral from responsibility."
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utmost to effect restitution or otherwise to
secure redress for the injury."'
The Japanese Government refused to offer any apology, disavowal or restitution
for this gross violation of Chinese neutralitV, and it must be admitted that her conduct

in this matter, although altogether exceptional, constitutes a blot upon a record

which is, thus far, otherwise

remarkably

clean and spotless from the standpoint of
International Law.
Three of the escaped vessels of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur sought refuge at
the German harbor of Tsing-Tau near the
entrance of Kiao-Chow Bay (the German
concession on the Shan-Tung peninsula) on
the night of August ii, v'iz.-the battleship
Carcvitch, the protected cruiser Novik and

several torpedo-boat destroyers. The Novik,
which was not seriously injured, was ordered to leave within twenty-four hours, in
accordance with the instructions of the German Government; but the Czarevitch and
several of the torpedo-boat destroyers,
being in an unseaworthy condition, were
permitted to remain to the end of the war
on condition that the vessels be disarmed

and their crews kept in the custody of the
German authorities until the
4
war.

end of the

On August 12 the Russian cruiser Askold
and the destroyer Grosovoi arrived at Shanghai-the former vessel being badly damaged, but the latter apparently in fairly good
or reject the principle supposed to underly the
decision of Napoleon in the case of the General
Armstrong it has no applicability in the case of
the Ryeshitelni. In the latter case, Japan was
clearly the actual as well as the real aggressor,
and the Russian commander had placed himself
under the protection of the Chinese Admiral who
proved to be a weakling or a coward.
'Walker, Science, p. 451.
'See the London Tines (weekly ed.) for August 19, 1904 The German Government is said to
have taken the position that belligerent warships
may repair damages for purposes of navigation in
any neutral port, but that their armament must
.Pot be repaired or augmented. See New York
Times for August 14, 1934.
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condition. The Russian consul was at once
requested by the Chinese authorities at
Shanghai to arrange for their departure
from that port within twenty-four hours.
He replied that, inasmuch as the ships
needed repairs, the Chinese demand was not
in accordance with the laws of neutrality,
and that reasonable time must be allowed
for the necessary repairs. Upon demand of
the Japanese consul that the Russian warships leave Shanghai forthwith or disarm,
the Chinese local authorities requested the
Commissioner of Customs to report upon
their condition and ascertain the period required for repairs. That official, having inspected the Grosovoi on August 16, reported
that the destroyer's boilers and machinery
needed repairs. On the other hand, it was
admitted that she had come to Shanghai
without reducing her speed.
In the meantime the situation was
changed by the receipt of telegraphic instructions from the Wai-wu-pu and the
Nanking Viceroy directing that both vessels
forthwith disarm or leave port, and an intimation on the part of Japan that unless this
were done, she (Japan) would send a portion of her fleet into the port and capture
these vessels, as in the case of the Rvcshitehn. In no case, it was announced, would
the Japanese Government tolerate a state
of affairs which permits Russian vessels to
find asylum in Chinese harbors and make
repairs that would enable them to resume
belligerent operations.
Upon the downright refusal of the Russian Consul General
to agree even to discuss this proposition,
the Chinese authorities again changed front
and ordered that a reasonable time be allowed for necessary repairs. But on August i9, after another threat on the part of
Japan, the Chinese authorities at Shanghai
demanded that the destroyer Grosovoi leave
that port within twenty-four hours, and that
the cruiser Askold complete her repairs
within forty-eight hours and afterwards de-

part within twenty-four hours, or that both
vessels disarm. Upon the second refusal
of the Russian Consul General to discuss
such a proposition, the question was referred to the Consular Body as a whole.
This body met on August 22, but failed to
accomplish anything, owing to the inflexible opposition of the Japanese Consul to
any action affecting the rights of belligerents. On August 24, apparently after the
Czar had ordered the disarmament of the
vessels, the Chinese executed another volte
face, and extended the time for the departtire of the warships. On August 27 the
Japanese Government addressed a note to
the Powers informing them that, unless
Russia forthwith disarm her warships at
Shanghai, Japan would be forced to take
whatever steps she deemed necessary to
protect her interests in that quarter.'
This
veiled threat seems to have had the desired
effect, for the Askold and Grosovoi were
finally dismantled and disarmed during the
first week of September, although not until
after further delays and a long controversy
between the Japanese, Russians and Chinese authorities with respect to the disposal
of the crews of these vessels. It was at last
agreed that the crews be interned in such
Chinese treaty-ports as contained Russian
consulates.
The last case to be considered in this con'See New York Times for August 28, 1904.
'The Russians proposed that the precedent set
in the case of the Maudjur be followed, and that
the crews be sent home at the first opportunity
which presented itself. The Japanese insisted,
however, that the same procedure be followed
as in the cases of the Russian vessels at the German port Tsing-Tau, vi2., that the crews be retained on Chinese territory, It is claimed by the
Japanese that the Russians violated their parole
in the case of the paroled crews of the T/ariag
and tihe Koriet, who have been drafted into the
service of the Baltic Fleet. See Shanghai Dispatch to the Chicago Tribuie for August 29, 1904.
See New York Times for October 27, 1904, for
confirmation

of this report.

For the facts bearing on the whole controversy
see especially London Times (weekly ed.) for
August i9

and 26 and September 2 and 9, 1904.
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nection is that of the armed transport Lena,
a converted cruiser of the Russian Volunteer Navy, which arrived at the port of San
Francisco on September ii. Her captain
stated that the ship's engines and boilers
needed repairs. It was believed at the time
that the vessel was on a cruising expedition
with the object of preying upon neutral
commerce or of capturing Japanese vessels
in the Pacific. The Japanese Consul at San
Francisco promptly demanded that the vessel be required to leave within twenty-four
hours. Mr. Stratton, the Collector of the
Port, refused to permit an inspection of the
ship by the Japanese Consul, rightly insisting that "the neutrality of the United States
will be maintained without regard to any request or act of the Japanese Consul," and
that "this matter is between the United
States and the Russian Government.'
An inspection of the vessel by the American
naval authorities showed that the boilers
were in such a bad condition that, although
the ship could make ten knots an hour with
them, it would not be seaworthy in a storm.
It was estimated that she would need six
weeks for temporary repairs. In the meantime all necessary precautions were taken to
prevent interference or the sending in to the
vessel of unauthorized supplies.
Acting upon the written request of the
commander of the Lena addressed to Rear
Admiral Goodrich, President Roosevelt issued an order on September 15 that the
Russian cruiser be disarmed and taken in
custody 1v the United States naval autlorities until the close of the wvar between Russia and Jal)an.In stating the law or custom which has
'See the New York Times and Chicago Tribune
for September 13, 1904.

"'The main features of the conditions prescribed are that the Lena be taken to the Mare
Island Navy Yard and there disarmed by removal of small guns, breech blocks of large guns,
small arms, ammunition and ordnance stores and
such other dismantlement as may be prescribed
by the commandant of the navy yard; that the
captain give a written guarantee that the Lena
shall not leave San Francisco until peace shall

8i9

hitherto been generally supposed to govern
such cases, it should be observed in the first
place that the so-called Right of Asylum of
belligerent armed ships in neutral ports
only exists, as a matter of strict law, in
cases where the vessels are driven into port
by stress of weather or when they have been
otherwise reduced to an unseaworthy condition; but permission to enter a port and enjoy its hospitality, at least for a short time,
is assumed in the absence of any express
notice to the contrary." "Nevertheless it
is a privilege based upon the consent of the
neutral, and therefore capable of being accompanied by any conditions he chooses to
impose."' As stated by Hall, it has hitherto generally been held that "a vessel of war
may enter and stay in a neutral harbor without any special reasons; she is not disarmed
on taking refuge after defeat; she may obtain such repair as will enable her to continue her voyage in safety; she may take in
such provisions as she needs, and if a
steamer she may fill up with coal; nor is
have been concluded; that the officers and crew
shall be paroled not to leave San Francisco until
some other understanding as to their disposal
may be reached between the United States Government and both the belligerents; that after disarmament the vessel may be removed to a private
dock for such reasonable repairs as will make her
seaworthy and preserve her in good condition
during her detention, or may be so repaired at
the navy yard if the Russian commander shoul l
so select; that while at a private dock the commandant of the navy yard at Mare Island shall
have custody of the ship and the repairs shall be
overseen by an engineer officer to be detailed 1-y
the commandant and that, when so repaired, if
peace shall not then have been concluded, the vcssel shall be taken back to the Mare Island Navy
Yard and be there held in custody until the end
of the war."-From the Army and Navy Journal
for September 17, 1904. It was finally agreed hetween the United States and Russia that the "officers and crews of the Lena shall have the freedom
of San Francisco, but that they may not go beyond the bounds of the city during the present
war nor return to Russia, except upon the c nclusion of an agreement upon this point between
Russia and Japan." Washington Dispatch to the
London Times for September i9, 1904.

'See Exchange v. McFaddon, cited above.
4

Lawrence, Principles, p. 509.

must, however,
belligerents.

Such conditions

be impartially applied to both
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there anything to prevent her from enjoying the security of neutral waters for so
long as may seem good to her."1
It has generally been assumed in current
discussions (and Japan appears to have acted
onthis assumption) that it would be a breach
of International Law for a neutral State to
permit belligerent warships to remain in a
neutral port longer than twenty-four hours,
except in case of necessity, or to allow such
vessels to take in supplies of coal oftener
than once in three months, and then only in
'Hall, §231, p. 63o. But Hall (p. 631) admits
that "in the treatment of ships. as in all other
matters in which the neutral holds his delicate
scale between two belligerents, a tendency toward
the enforcement of a harsher rule becomes more
defined with each successive war." As everyone
knows, the rule is entirely different with respect

to belligerent troops which have been driven into
neutral territory or which have sought refuge on
neutral soil. Such troops are interned and kept

there until paroled or until the close of the war.
See Arts. 57 and 58 of the Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land adopted by
The Hague Conference, Holls, p i6o.
Dana (note 208 to Wheaton, p. 524) thus defines the obligations of neutrals in respect to the
use of its ports by belligerent cruisers: "It may
be considered the settled practice of nations, intending to be neutral, to prohibit belligerent
cruisers from entering their ports, except from
stress of weather or other necessity, or for the

purpose of obtaining provisions and making repairs requisite for seaworthiness. They must not
increase their armament or crew, or add to their
belligerent efficiency. It is now the custom to
fix a short time for the stay of such vessels, after
they have done what is permitted them, or the
marine exigency has passed,-.usually twenty-four
hours. These rules are, however, at the option
of the neutral."
Taylor (p. 690) lays down the following rules:
"In addition to the observance of all quarantine
rules, local revenue and harbor regulations, the
belligerent ship must respect all prohibitions designed to prevent the use of the neutral port for

purposes other than those of immediate necessity.
While the fighting force of such a ship may not
be reinforced or recruited in such a port, nor
supplies of arms and warlike stores or other
equipments of direct use for war obtained, such
supulies and equipments may be purchased as are
necessary to sustain life or carry on navigation.
If she is in need of repairs she may procure whatever is needful to put her in a seaworthy condition, including masts, spars and cordage. But she
cannot make such structural changes as will increase her efficiency as a fighting machine, either
of offense or defense. She may take in such provisions as she needs: and, if a steamer, she may
purchase enough coal to enable her to reach the
nearest port of her own country."

quantity sufficient to take them to the nearest home port or to some nearer neutral
destination. It is true that neutral States
are under an international obligation to prevent their ports from being used as a base
of military operations or as a constant and
regular base of supplies (whether of arms,
coal or supplies), or for the purpose of augmenting the force of an armed vessel in the
service of a belligerent or of increasing its
military efficiency. It is also true that a
considerable practice has grown up in recent times in favor of the twenty-four hour
rule and in favor of strictly limiting the supply of coal permitted to belligerent vessels
in neutral ports. But the details and specific
content of such means or measures for carrying out their international obligations has
been left by International Law to neutral
2
Governments.
-The rule limiting the stay of belligerent
armed vessels in a neutral port to twenty-four
hours, "except in the case of stress of weather,
injuries or exhaustion of provisions necessary for
the safety of the voyage, save that an interval of
twenty-four hours must elapse between the sailings of vessels of opponents," was first introduced into international practice by France in
1861. See Walker, Science, p. 455. Similar regulations were adopted by Great Britain, Spain,
On January 31, 1862, the British
and Brazil.

Government published a series of neutrality reg-

ulations more stringent than any heretofore issued. They provided that "war vessels of either
belligerent should be required to depart within
twenty-four hours of their entry, unless they
needed more time for taking in innocent supplies or effecting lawful repairs, in which case
they were to obtain special permission to remain
for a longer period, and were to put to sea within
twenty-four hours after the reason for their remaining ceased. They might freely purchase
provisions and other things necessary for the subsistence of their crews: but the amount of coal
they were allowed to receive was limited to as
much as was necessary to take them to the nearest port of their own country. Moreover, no two
supplies of coals were to be obtained in British

waters within three months of each other." Lawrence, Principles, pp. 310-11.
These restrictions upon the liberty of belligerent ships in neutral ports were adopted by the
United States in 187o, and they have been reimposed by Great Britain and the United States
in successive wars. They have also been copied,

either in whole or part., by other States, e.g., by
Spain and Brazil. It is well known that the
twenty-four-hour rule was enforced by Great
Britain and Portugal during the Spanish-Ameri-

Some Questions of Internationa!Law.
As has been said, neutral Governments
may impose such conditions upon belligerent armed vessels in their ports as they
deem necessary or advisable for the purpose
of enforcing their neutral obligations provided such rules or regulations as they choose
to make are impartially enforced against
both belligerents. But they are bound by the
law of nations to make such rules and provide such means for their enforcement as
may be necessary to insure a strict and imcan war in 1898. The provisions of the British
Neutrality Regulations of 1862 were repeated in
the Neutrality Proclamations issued by Great
Britain and the United States at the opening of
the present war, and, as has been noted, Great
Britain issued still more stringent instructions in
August, 1904. The Scandinavian States have also
issued very stringent rules regulating the admission and conduct of belligerent vessels in their
ports, Sweden, as it appears, going to the extent of excluding them altogether. See an article
by the eminent German jurist Laband in Die
IWoche for May 28, 1904. Cf. Lawrence War and
Neutrality, p. 133, whose statement that all the
Scandinavian States "have closed their ports to
the public vessels of both belligerents, with the
exception of hospital ships," appears to be incorrect. "The I'rench Circular of Neutrality, issued on
F'ebruary
18, 1904, limited permissile supplies and repairs to those necessary for *the subsistence of the
crews
and the safety of the navigation,' and forbade the use of French waters for warlike purposes, or for the acquisition of information, or
as bases of operation against the enemy." Lawrence, op. cit., p. 123. The vessels belonging to
the Russian Mediterranean fleet at Jibutil were,
however, as we have seen, permitted to fill their
bunkers with coal and they were allowed to enjoy the hospitality of that port for more than
twenty-four hours. All such details are said to
be omitted in the German Proclamation of Neutrality, issued on February 13, 1904, according to
the terms of which all Germans, whether at home
or abroad, are simply enjoined to observe "the
strictest neutrality in all their relations," officers
of the Crown being charged with the enforcement of such neutrality.
See Chicago RecordHerald for February 14, 1904. Germany, as has
been noted, enforced the twenty-four-hour rule
in the case of the Russian cruiser Novik at TsingTau, although she appears to take a more lenient
view of her neutral obligations in respect to the
coaling of the Baltic fleet. Spain also at first
showed a disposition to enforce the twenty-fourhour rule in the case of the Baltic Fleet at Vigo,
and only extended the time for a special purpose
and after consulting the Powers. A limited supply
of coal is said to have been furnished to Russian
vessels belonging to this fleet during its stay at
that port in October.
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partial neutrality-a neutrality which consists in absolute abstention from any acts or
services which would tend to strengthen the
fighting forces of either belligerent or which
would amount to an actual or potential participation in the war. For this reason a belligerent armed vessel should not be allowed
to remain in a neutral port for a longer
period of time than is absolutely necessary
in order to procure innocent supplies or to
effect necessary repairs (i. e., those absolutely necessary); and steamships should n3t
be allowed to coal except in case of necessity, and then only in quantity sufficient to
take them to the nearest home port or (1 etter still) to the nearest available neutral
destination.'
The measure or amount of repairs permitted or supplies allowed to belligerent
armed vessels in neutral ports should be
determined by what is absolutely needed to
make them navigable or seaworthy as distinct from rendering them more efficient as
fighting machines or increasing their warlike capacity3
"Speaking generally, we
may say that a belligerent ship must not
leave a neutral port a more efficient fighting
machine than she entered it, except in so far
as increased efficiency may come from increased seaworthiness or a better supply of
provisions. On the other hand, neutrals
may permit the supply of things necessary
for subsistence, and they may repair in their
ports and waters damage due to the action
of the sea. A distinction is drawn between
what is necessary for life and what is neces''
sary for war. 3
'It has also been customary to interpose a
time limit of twenty-four hours between the sailings of two or more hostile ships in belligerent
waters. The object of this rule is to prevent
fighting in the neighborhood of neutral waters.
It dates from the middle of the eighteenth century. This is the custom which is generally referred to in treatises as the twenty- four-hour rule.
'Under this rule the engines and boilers of
such a vessel might be repaired, but not so her
guns or armament.
'Lawrence, WT7ar anid A-eutrality, p. 121.
Lawrence adds, "It is not very logical, because a man
must live before he can fight, and those things

